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THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN AL-GHAZALI AND THE 
PHILOSOPHERS ON THE ORIGIN OF THE WORLD 
PART I1 
The philosophers’ third and fourth proofs of the eternity of the woild 
are both based on the concept of possibility. 
In the third proof 1 the argument turns around the possibility of the 
world as a whole. I t  can be stated very briefly, as follows : 
Everyone must admit that at least the possibility of the world’s exis- 
tence is eternal; for it could never have been impossible and then be- 
come possible. But what can possibly exist eternally must actually do 
so, because, as Ibn Rushd puts it, “what can receive eternity cannot 
become corruptible” 2, i.e. have a beginning or ending. 
I t  is not clear how this conclusion follows, until we see that the 
argument rests on a hidden assumption, pointed out by Van den Bergh 3 
that the world as a whole is ungenerated. Now everything ungenerated 
is eternal, because by definition it could never have come into existence 
or been corrupted. In this case it can be argued: the world is certainly 
possible. I t  has also existed actually at mme time. But if it existed at 
any time, it must have done so at every time, since it is not subject to 
generation or decay (al-kaun wu-Z-fasdd) . 
The assumption made, that the world is ungenerated, begs the whole 
question at issue, as Van den Bergh has shown. If we substitute ‘(So- 
crates” for “the world” we can start off with the premise : “the possibi- 
lity of Socrates’ existence is eternal.” But it is obvious that we cannot 
prove from this that Socrates is actually eternal. 
Al-Ghazgli makes this objection, saying quite correctly that eternal 
possibility does not imply eternal actuality, “for reality does not con- 
form to possibility but differs from it.” 4 He does not see the hidden 
assumption, that the world as a whole is something ungenerated. Even 
if he had seen it, he would not have accepted it as a proved fact. 
The fourth p o o f  5 concerns the relation o€ possibility to matter, 
inside the world. The philosophers’ argument can be stated as follows. 
While the world as a whole is ungenerated and uncorrupted, the world 
in detail is continually changing. Change means the combination of fresh 
forms in matter, making new things actual. Now every new combina- 
tion was eternally possible. But possibility requires a substratum, mat- 
ter, in which the changes of form take place. Therefore this substratum, 
matter, must also be eternal. 
This is the essence of the philosophers’ argument. Here a criticism 
may be offered, which does not occur in Al-Ghazfili. I t  seems to me 
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that the philosophers, including Ibn Rushd, confuse logical possibility 
with potentiality. Then they compose an argument by selecting the most 
favorable feature of each of the two concepts, as follows : every possi- 
bility is eternal; matter is implied by every potentiality; therefore mat- 
ter is eternal. 
In the syllogism, stated thus, it is obvious that the supposed middle 
term is ambiguous, that is to say there is no real middle term. If we 
take each of the two concepts and apply it exclusively in the syllogism, 
we can see that it does not lead to the desired conclusion. 
First, let us take possibility in its correct logical sense. We say that 
any state of affairs is possible if its existence is not logically impossible 
owing to self-contradiction or some other logical absurdity. In  this 
sense, the major premise is correct, for the existence of each changing 
thing in the world was always a possibility. But no substratum of actual 
matter is implied by this logical possibility. Therefore, the eternity of 
matter does not follow. 
Now consider the other alternative, potentiality. Here the minor pre- 
mise is correct, that matter is implied by every potentiality; for in the 
Aristotelian system potentialities belong to actually existing matter. 
This boy has the potentiality of becoming a man, but not that of beco- 
ming a snake. In the same way everything has its fixed and limited 
potentialities, according to the nature of its species. What the poten- 
tialities of each thing are can only be discovered by empirical obser- 
vation of the development of real things. So potentialities are a kind 
of attribute, which can onIy be spoken of in connection with real things. 
Their existence implies the existence of some matter, in the sense 
that they only exist where matter exists. Rut i f  we turn to the major 
premise and say “Every potentiality is eternal,” we can now see that 
there is no justification for such an assertion. Indeed potentialities 
are peculiarly temporal, for they belong to instances of species only at 
a particular stage of development. Therefore once more there is no 
proof of the eternity of matter. 
Al-Ghazdi does not see this ambiguity in the philosophers’ argu- 
ment, nor does Ibn Rushd. Their discussion revolves around logical 
possibility only, and deals with the ontological status of possibility. IS 
it subjective or objective? This is a very difficult question. The dis- 
cussion of it in I’ahfut has great intrinsic interest, but no relevance 
to the question about the world. For even if we accept the philosophers’ 
view, that possibility has some kind of objective existence as an object 
of knowledge, still this would prove nothing about the actual existence 
of the world, which is the point at issue. 
Our conclusion from the two arguments from possibility must be 
that nothing can be proved about the actual from the possible. This is 
inevitable because the nature of the actual can only be known from evi- 
dence, and the possible provides no evidence. The logically possible 
always offers at least two alternatives, for if “A is B” is possible, “A 
310 THE MUSLIM WORLD 
is not B” must also be possible; but logic provides no way of choosing 
between them and deciding which is true. Such a decision can only 
come from actuality, by observation and inference. In the issue before 
us, both an eternal world and a finite world are possible; therefore 
no amount of reflection about possibility will tell us which is actual. 
From this survey the four proofs of the first discussion of the 
Tahcifuts, our conclusion is that in none of them have the philosophers 
made out their case for the eternity of the world. This is partly, no 
doubt, due to the superior skill and clarity of Al-GhazBli, and the some- 
what disappointing performance of Ibn Rushd in this debate. But there 
is a more essential reason, connected with the methods of the two par- 
ties (the philosophers and Al-GhazBli). We now examine their theories 
of knowledge and their methods of aiming at the truth about such 
questions as the origin of the world. We shall confine ourselves first 
to discussing their rational methods, and then mention their views on 
revelation at the end. 
For  the philosophers, the truth about the world can be deduced by 
demonstrative arguments (syllogisms) which make use of sound pre- 
mises. And the premises can be known in two ways : by observation of 
the world, which gives us empirical knowledge, and by intellectual ap- 
prehension of primary axioms, which gives us intuitive knowledge. 
Examples of such axioms, in the Aristotelian tradition, are : every event 
must have a cause; causes produce their effects necessarily; the cause 
cannot be identical with that part of the object which is moved or af- 
f ected. 
These axioms are not analytic statements, known to be true by mere 
analysis of language. But they are thought of as no less ultimate truths, 
which cannot be proved or disproved by further argument. The test of 
their certainty is that all men of sufficient understanding and education 
admit them, just as anyone with these qualities admits mathematical 
truths. Consequently, if we accept the axioms of the Aristotelian sys- 
tem, together with its empirical knowledge or beliefs, we should be 
able to work out for ourselves the very same conclusions about the 
world - provided there are no fallacies in the reasoning on either side. 
The philosophers do not adinit imagination as a source of truth. 
A good imagination is a great help to a man, in enabling his intellect 
to grasp quickly the relevant connections between facts and “see the 
middle term.” But the imagination of objects or of relations between 
them is in itself no guarantee of the reality of the objects or the rela- 
tions. 
When we come to Al-Ghazdi, we have to get rid of a false impres- 
sion which has become traditional concerning his attitude to reason. 
This is the idea that Al-Ghaziili mistrusted reason. Such an idea can 
only lead to confusion about him, for one may ask: “What was he 
doing in his Tafifut?” To say that he was carrying on an activity 
which he rejected later, when he became a Sfifi, will only land us in 
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worse confusion when we read his later books, for many of them are 
just as much works or reason as Tatkifut al-Falasifah. His whole view 
of reason can only be learned from a careful study of his biography 
and doctrines. Much could be said on this subject, but here comment 
will be confined to his 7ahifut .  
The fact is that Al-Ghaziili accepts in principle all the rational sour- 
ces of knowledge accepted by the philosophers : observation, axioms and 
reasoning. He also rejects imagination, emphatically. The difference 
between him and the philosophers, in the sphere of rational knowledge, 
is that he rejects much of their particular reasoning as fallacious or 
contradictory, and some of their most important axioms as not known 
by any intuition. Their faulty reasoning might no doubt be regarded 
as remediable. But the weakness of their axioms is more serious; it 
leads him to conclude that the philosophers’ positions on the origin of 
the world, and other questions, cannot be proved by direct rational 
methods. Reason is valid as far as it goes, but it does not cover as 
much ground as the philosophers think. 
The disagreement of method, therefore, between the philosophers 
and Al-Ghaziili resolves itself in the main in to this: that the philo- 
sophers place more reliance on intuition and so accept a greater number 
of axioms of reason. What happens when they assert that something 
is known by intuition and Al-Ghaz5li denies it? An example occurs in 
Tahafut al-Faliisifah pp. 29-30. The philosophers have asserted that 
it is impossible to see in an eternal Will (of God) a cause producing 
the world in time, after a delay and not from eternity. Al-Ghazfili 
answers, on behalf of the Ash‘arites, that such an assertion of impossi- 
bility must either be proved by argument or known by intuition, by a 
direct necessity of thought. If it is proved, the philosophers should 
bring forth their argument. If it is known by intuition, why do their 
opponents the Ash‘arites not share this intuition ? Ibn Rushd believes 
that the assertion in question is derived from the axiom “Effect fol- 
lows cause immediately,” and he answers Al-Ghazdi’s methodological 
objection by saying: “It is not a condition of objective truth that it 
should be known to a11.”6 But this as it stands is an unsatisfactory 
answer. For, as Van den Bergh points out, 7 to Aristotelians the test of 
the objective truth of first principles is their universal acknowledge- 
ment. Perhaps Ibn Rushd is thinking of the well-known qualifications 
of the principle of universal acknowledgement : that the judge of philo- 
sophical truth must have natural intelligence and an intellectual educa- 
tion. Elsewhere he says that when someone denies a truth that is cer- 
tain and evident, it must be because he is unintelligent or uneducated. 8 
But the answer is still unsatisfactory; for a man like Al-Ghazfili him- 
self, for instance, had all the required qualities and could understand 
TT, p. 13. 
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the philosophers’ assertion perfectly well; but he could still reject it. 
The fact is that when such a conflict arises about a supposed intui- 
tion, it is no use saying dogmatically : “My intuition is sound and yours 
is unsound,” or “I am qualified to understand and you are not.” We 
should be able to obtain agreement from every reasonable judge. If 
we cannot, then it is well to look at the supposed intuition again more 
closely and ask whether it really is one. 
In  modern times we have learnt to do this more and more, under the 
influence of Hume and Kant in particular. Hume showed that every 
sensible statement can only be justified as true in one of two ways: 
either we know it analytically, by simply understanding the meaning 
of our language, as in definitions; or it must be justified ultimately 
by some empirical observation. Thus we can learn nothing about the 
real world by supposed axioms of reason. For instance, if someone 
asserts : “Every effect follows its cause by a logical necessity,” we 
must ask : “How do you know that ?” If he answers : “I know it be- 
cause it is implied in the notions of cause and effect as I understand 
them,” we must tell him: “You may understand concepts as you like, 
but you cannot show that this kind of cause and effect exists in the real 
world, for you cannot point out one ‘necessary connection’ between ob- 
served events.” Necessary connections exist primarily between state- 
ments or propositions, when one logically implies another. We can say 
loosely that an event implies another, but it can do so only in com- 
bination with a natural law, and all laws are known only empirically, 
not as logically necessary. Kant did not accept Hume’s sweeping theory 
entirely, but he was aware of the difficulty posed by synthetic state- 
ments about the world which appear to be known only b priori, not by 
any empirical evidence. In  the case of assertions about the origin of 
the world, he showed in the “Antinomies of pure reason” that opposite 
assertions can appear equally convincing if we follow the old dogmatic 
methods of starting from supposed axioms of reason; and he gave the 
arguments on both sides, “proving” both the eternity of the world and 
its beginning in finite time. 9 
The conclusion we have to draw about the world is then as follows. 
Let us take the statement “The world is eternal.” The writer does not 
question that this statement has a meaning, as some people would (the 
logical positivists). I t  it taken here as meaningful, also as synthetic: 
i.e. “eternal” is an attribute not contained in the concept of “world.” 
I then say to myself: the opposite statement, “The world had a begin- 
ning in time, at a finite interval from the present,” is equally meaning- 
ful (and synthetic). I can conceive either statement as being true. How 
then am I to decide which is really true ? I have absolutely no empirical 
evidence, since prehistory, geology and astronomy do not take us back 
to a known beginning of all things. The arguments which employ 
9 The first antinomy, in Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed., pp. 454-61. 
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axioms of reason are also worthless, because when we examine the 
axioms we find that they are either (a) analytic statements giving us no 
knowledge about the empirical world, or (b) synthetic statements about 
the world which have to support from empirical observation, the only 
kind of support that can justify such statements. Any claim that such 
axioms are known by intuition simply breaks down when someone 
denies the intuition, and claims the opposite assertion as conceivable and 
possibly true. Thus we lack any rational way of finding out whether 
the world is eternal or of finite duration, though it must in fact be one 
or the other. 
Coming back now to the Islamic philosophers and Al-Ghaziili, we 
can see that the former followed the somewhat dogmatic tradition of 
Aristotelian philosophy - dogmatic at least in the sense mentioned, 
of acceptance of a number of axioms of reason over and above the 
principles of logic. We have seen how each of the four proofs con- 
tains at least one such axiom as an essential part of its argument. In the 
first proof, there is the principle of determination of all wills by know- 
ledge of the good (the principle of “sufficient reason”), also that of 
immediate action of all causes. In  the second there is the principle that 
time implies actual movement. In  the third, there is the concealed as- 
sumption that the world as a whole must be ungenerated. And in the 
fourth, there is the confused assertion that possibility requires a sub- 
stratum of matter. Thus the philosophers were vulnerable to the kind 
of attack made by empiricists: How do you know this? What can you 
say to people who claim an opposite intuition ? We have seen Al-Ghaziili 
making just this kind of attack. He did so not because he denied the 
possibility of axioms of reason -he did not draw the full conclusions 
of post-Humean empirical philosophy. But he was freer than the philo- 
sophers to deny particular axioms, because he was not bound to Aris- 
totelianism, emotionally or by education. Thus it seems clear, to the 
writer at least, that Al-Ghaziili’s position was stronger on grounds of 
method. 
I t  now remains to outline in a summary fashion the attitudes of the 
parties towards revelation, in order to complete the picture of the 
sources of truth. 
For the Islamic philosopher, Scripture is of course a source of truth 
and not of falsehood. Everything in it is true, when it is correctly 
interpreted, and the major truths about the world are all contained in 
the Qur’iin or Traditions in one place or another. But all these truths 
can also be known independently by the rational methods described 
above, and these methods also produce them in a direct and scientific 
form, and no doubt with more detail. In Scripture the literal meaning 
often conceals the scientific truth from the masses. This is the position 
of Ibn Rushd, at least about theoretical science, with which we are 
now concerned. 
For Al-GhazHli, Scripture holds a more essential place as a source 
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of truth. Rational sources leave large gaps in our knowledge of the 
world, and some of these gaps are filled by revelation, the Qur35n and 
Traditions. They tell us truths about the world that we could never have 
dicovered for ourselves, e.g. that the world was created by God at a 
past time, a finite number of years ago. And it is not an irrational act 
of faith to accept Scripture as a sound source of knowiedge : there are 
rational grounds for believing that the Qur’iin, in particular, is a divine 
revelation and therefore true. I t  is therefore rational to accept the indi- 
vidual statements of the Qur’iin on the basis of our confidence in the 
whole, just as a child who trusts his parents believes that their orders 
are right even when he does not see their justification for a particular 
order. 
A third position is possible, that of some modern empiricists who 
hold that neither axioms of reason nor Scripture are valid sources of 
truth, at least about such questions as the origin of the world. Accor- 
ding to this view there is no way at all of knowing the answer to the 
question we have been discussing. We have seen that there is common 
ground between Al-Ghazdi’s position and such modern empiricism, 
but their final conclusions about the world are widely divergent because 
of their different views of revelation. But perhaps there are other em- 
piricists who also accept revelation, and thus come closer to Al-GhazBli’s 
position. 
Behind the attitudes of the Islamic philosophers and Al-Ghaziili there 
are different emotional attachments : of the philosophers to Aristotle 
and the rest of their philosophic heritage; of Al-GhazBli to the Scrip- 
tures of Islam and the traditions of Islamic learning. These attachments 
provide much of the background which helps us to understand why they 
held to their philosophic positions. But this is not the place to enter 
into psychological history. Ostensibly the debate in the Tahafuts is 
conducted by direct arguments without reference to Aristotle or reve- 
lation as commanding authorities. This is possible because the philoso- 
phers think they can prove their theses by reason, and Al-Ghaziili 
thinks he can undermine them by reason alone without reference to 
Scripture. 
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